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Introduction ■
Large institutional investors are increasingly aware that 
it is in their long-term interest to engage with manage-
ment to improve a company’s performance rather than 
simply to sell their shares (Hawley and Williams, 2007; 
Bhagat, Black and Blair, 2004). They realize that their 
impact is magniﬁ ed when they coordinate their actions, 
and a rapidly rising form of shareholder activism is via 
collaborative coalitions and networks (Thamotheram and 
Wildsmith, 2007).  Moreover, they have a ﬁ duciary duty 
to act as responsible investors which entails monitoring 
their investments in a professional manner and voting 
their shareholdings at companies’ shareholder meet-
ings. Many institutional investors ﬁ nd it increasingly 
effective to outsource their ﬁ duciary duty to professional 
shareholder activists. These activists may perform proxy 
analyses, provide voting recommendations and/or execute 
share voting; they may contract with investors and create 
coordinated networks for engaging privately with man-
agement; or they may mobilize a shareholder network 
behind a public shareholder activist campaign.
As a result, numerous global shareholder networks 
have emerged with different objectives and coordination 
mechanisms.  Corporate social responsibility engagement 
encompasses such institutional investor networks as the 
Carbon Disclosure Project, UN Principles of Responsi-
ble Investment (now UNPRI), CERES, Global Reporting 
Initiative, and the Enhanced Analytics Initiative (Clark 
and Hebb, 2004; Tkac, 2006). There are also corporate 
governance investor networks such as the International 
Corporate Governance Network (ICGN). However, in our 
study, we focus on those professional investment services 
and actors whose express aim is to improve performance 
through enhanced corporate governance or direct private 
or public engagement with management (Corporate 
Executive Board, 2008).
Concomitantly, pressure from the international invest-
ment community resulted in revisions to many countries’ 
laws concerning corporate governance that has facilitated 
its greater inﬂ uence. In France, the need for ﬁ nancial 
capital drove the French government and ﬁ rms to adopt 
selective legal and institutional modiﬁ cations (Lee and 
Yoo, 2008) imposed by Anglo-Saxon institutional investors 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). As a consequence, 
shareholder activism in France has become more and 
more the result of professional actors.  
This paper makes three contributions: it is the ﬁ rst to 
analyse this professionalization of shareholder activism 
in France.  Second, it determines the roles played by net-
works in French shareholder activism by attempting to 
identify the diversity of relationships between activism 
sponsors, activist professionals and institutional inves-
tor networks. Third, it describes the investor network 
process through two recent examples.  
In the ﬁ rst part of this paper, we provide an overview 
of the theoretical and empirical literature on shareholder 
activism in France. This part explains the changes in 
French legislation and corporate governance which facili-
tated international investor networks’ activism up to the 
recent adoption of AIFM directive1. We then develop the 
conceptual model that may explain their effects on tar-
geted French corporations. In the second part, we provide 
a description of three shareholder activist professional 
actors that mobilize institutional investor networks and 
illustrate their role in strategic decisions concerning two 
targeted French companies. 
I. Shareholder activism in  ■
France 
Changes in French legislation have strengthened the 
impact of institutional investor networks and led to the 
professionalization of shareholder activism. In this sec-
tion, we review the theoretical and empirical literature 
to present a conceptual model of French shareholder 
activism that we believe explains the formal and informal 
relationships between all the diverse actors in sharehol-
der activism.
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I.1. INCREASING COMPLEXITY OF THE 
FRENCH SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
PROCESS
The French shareholder activism process remains a 
hybrid model with a continuum of possible private and 
public activities simultaneously accompanied by legal 
actions from French investor associations. Girard (2003) 
reported that an activist shareholder’s announcement reg-
istered only a low level of public perception as measured 
by cumulative abnormal returns.  This could be explained 
by the passive role of institutional investors due to the 
following three legal constraints and obstacles: (1) prior 
to the 2001 New Economic Regulation law, they needed 
to gather 10% of voting rights to be able to put forward 
a shareholder proposal2; (2) they were not required to 
report on the exercise of their voting rights attached to 
the shares held by the collective pension schemes until 
the 2003 Financial Security law; (3) and they had to 
block their shares ﬁ ve days before the Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) until the 2005 Mansion Report. Before 
these three legislative changes in France, Girard (2001) 
observed that institutional investors usually preferred 
to mandate French investor associations to improve the 
chance of success for shareholder activism. 
French investor associations generally initiate a legal 
action at an early stage of the process which may either 
replace or accompany other activities. The advantages of 
immediately launching a law suit were: (1) to make use of 
legal loopholes; (2) to threaten that an AGM be convened 
by a representative appointed by the court; (3) to put a halt 
to proceedings to gain time to convince passive share-
holders to coordinate their proxy voting actions by using 
public engagement practices such as media coverage; (4) 
or to negotiate a higher exit premium during a takeover 
attempt. Clément (2006) reported that the organization 
of a proxy ﬁ ght in France usually takes place after share-
holders have been notiﬁ ed of an AGM. Filing a law suit 
once the AGM has been announced can effectively halt the 
process and give time in order to mobilize shareholder 
voting. Threatening a legal action can also help in nego-
tiating an arrangement behind closed doors. 
Despite the fact that the 2001 New Economic Regulation 
law accompanied an ongoing process of closing legal 
loopholes, Girard (2011) observed that the number of 
French investor associations has continued to increase. 
Currently there are more than twenty, each specializing in 
speciﬁ c legal actions such as civil, penal or class action. 
Prior to 2001, Girard noted that 63% of activist activities 
took the form of a law suit but that subsequently this 
proportion has fallen to less than one-third. 
More recently, investor associations such as l’Association 
Des Actionnaires Minoritaires (ADAM), led by Colette Neuville, 
collaborate regularly with hedge fund activists “as long 
as their objectives go beyond the short term and help to 
create value for all the shareholders,” as she stated in an 
article entitled “Minority shareholders support hedge fund 
activism,” (Les Echos, August 24, 2005). Are hedge funds 
set to become the new allies of minority shareholders? 
What role will they play within shareholder activism?  
In order to better understand how the activist hedge funds 
operate, we will explain some of their techniques. To limit 
their capital investment and risk exposure, activist hedge 
funds enlist the support of institutional investors as well 
as fellow hedge funds. Activist shareholders can leverage 
their relatively small stake in a target company through 
one or more tactics.  First, they can federate like-minded 
hedge funds and ﬁ le in the US a schedule 13-D disclosure 
form as one “person” acting as a group for the purpose of 
acquiring, holding or disposing of securities of an issuer 
(Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, 2008). Second, they 
can act in so-called “wolf packs” of like-minded inves-
tors without disclosure under certain conditions where 
their discussions or brainstorming are not deemed to 
constitute a “plan or proposal” (Briggs, 1994). This helps 
the activists avoid making a 13-D ﬁ ling once they hit the 
ownership disclosure threshold since this might trigger 
a poison pill if the company has one in place. Finally, the 
term “remora funds” refers to other investment advisors 
or asset management ﬁ rms that follow an activist investor 
after it has ﬁ led its 13-D disclosure.  
Activist hedge funds can also utilize tactics that leverage 
their shareholding in concert with a network of insti-
tutional investors. Stock lending is a practice that has 
developed broadly, and allows hedge funds to execute 
hedging and short-selling transactions, in other words, 
to vote shares without making an equity investment. It 
also leads to over-voting the shares as both the hedge 
fund borrower and the beneﬁ cial owner (who does not 
receive notice of the lending transaction) vote the same 
shares (Katten Muchin Rosenman Client Memorandum, 
2010). Hu and Black (2006) also documented how activ-
ist hedge funds have learned to abuse the stock lending 
market through a process that they named “empty vot-
ing”. Activist hedge funds ﬁ rst borrow large blocks of 
shares just prior to the record date. They then use hedg-
ing techniques to control enough votes to inﬂ uence the 
outcome of a shareholder vote without actually holding 
an economic interest in the company.
Finally, the main advantage of these techniques is to 
reduce the costs (communication and buying shares) 
incurred by an activist to overcome the problems of col-
lective action, such as gathering the required threshold 
of voting rights to put forward a shareholder proposal, 
or withdrawing or at least contesting a managerial pro-
posal. It is worth remembering that in France, only 5% of 
voting rights are required to put a shareholder resolution 
on the agenda of the AGM, and only 5% of voting rights 
are required to call an AGM. While this requirement 
might seem low, in practice it is not: more than half of 
AGMs in French companies occur only after they have 
been called a second time. The low level of shareholder 
participation in the AGM serves the interests of the activ-
ist hedge funds, which often represent more than 20% 
of the capital at the AGM. Charlety, Chevillon and Mes-
saoudi (2009) conﬁ rmed that there were coordinated vot-
ing strategies at AGMs among the SBF 250 (the second 
French index) companies during the period 2005-2008. 
They determined that shareholder resolutions proposed 
by hedge funds received an average rate of approval of 
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45%. However, they demonstrated that the higher the 
rate of participation from shareholders other than the 
resolution sponsor, the lower the average rate of resolu-
tion approval at the AGM.  
In addition, since 2001 professionals have appeared in 
France, such as Risk Metrics/Deminor, Proxinvest and 
the France-based asset management association AFG 
(Association Française de Gestion). Such new actors offer 
proxy advising services consisting of voting recommen-
dations and proxy solicitation services, which enhance 
the effectiveness of the activist coalition’s campaign. 
Active investors are inﬂ uenced by their recommenda-
tions to vote in favour or against a proposal. Charlety et al. 
(2009) discovered that AFG recommendations encourage 
passive shareholders to vote in favour of proposals put 
forward by an activist coalition. Alexander, Chen, Seppi 
and Spatt (2008) determined that these activist profes-
sionals play a dual informational role in the shareholder 
activism process. 
They serve both to certify the relative quality of compet-
ing management teams and corporate governance sys-
tems and to predict activism outcomes by conveying new 
information to the market. Consequently, the emergence 
of activist hedge funds and proxy professionals in France 
has changed the French shareholder activism process. 
I.2. CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF FRENCH 
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM PROCESS 
Corporate governance theory defines shareholder 
activism as a confrontational process which can be 
divided into several stages (Wahal, 1996). Recently, the 
Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (ISC, 2005) has 
replaced “activism” with “engagement”. Several leading 
US and UK shareholders routinely follow different, non-
standardized engagement practices (see Buchanan and 
Yang (2009) for a comparative analysis).  
As shown in Table 1, the ﬁ rst stage involves target selection 
from a portfolio of ﬁ rms. The activists’ motive to become 
engaged could relate to underperformance, governance 
or social and environmental issues as categorized by 
Klein and Zur (2009) and Brav and al. (2008) according 
to the level of aggressiveness.  Klein and Zur categorize 
as aggressive the following non-routine motives: change 
the board; oppose a proposed merger; sell the ﬁ rm; buy 
more stock with the intention of buying the ﬁ rm; buy back 
its own stock; oust the CEO; criticize executive excessive 
remuneration; and pay a cash dividend. 
The second stage, known as “behind the scenes” or “pri-
vate engagement”, consists of informal communication 
activities (private meetings with the CEO and the chairman, 
meetings with board members).  At this stage, private 
engagement is collaborative. The target management 
agrees with the changes sought by the activist coalition, 
and implements them in cooperation with this coalition 
(Becht, Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 2009). 
In contrast, the third stage becomes confrontational 
because the target management refuses the changes sought 
by the activists. Known as “public engagement”, this 
stage refers to the proxy voting process. It involves voting 
solicitation activities to submit a shareholder proposal 
or to contest a managerial proposal at the shareholders’ 
meeting. It may also be characterized by activities such 
as media coverage, lobbying activities and launching a 
proxy battle. In the American context, Gillan and Starks 
(2000) show that institutional investors prefer to engage 
with a target company at a lower level of confrontation 
since 73 percent of shareholder resolutions were with-
drawn before the AGM meeting in the period 1987-1994. 
Shareholder resolutions remain relatively infrequent in 
Continental Europe in comparison to the USA (Cziraki, 
Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010). In France, there are few 
shareholder resolutions either submitted or withdrawn. 
In its 2009 European voting results report, RiskMetrics 
observed that only 21 shareholder proposals were sub-
mitted at French AGMs (among them 15 were rejected) 
and out of 194 proposals put forward by management 
and shareholders relating to share incentive plans, only 
4 were subsequently withdrawn. 
Finally, the fourth stage is characterized by the most 
confrontational degree of activism, namely the exit of dis-
satisﬁ ed shareholders and/or a takeover attempt and/or a 
law suit (Wahal, 1996). Nevertheless, the French activism 
process remains a hybrid model with an early recourse to 
parallel legal actions. In the period 2001-2004, Huynh (2009) 
observed among the 71 French ﬁ rms listed in the SBF index 
a gradual increase in activist shareholders tactics. Compared 
with the USA and the UK, in France the proxy battle remains 
“the main vector of direct dialogue between the CEO and 
shareholders” (Huynh, 2009, p. 301). Huynh also observed 
positive correlations between legal actions and calls for an 
Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM).  In particular, if 
executive remuneration is the motive, shareholder activism 
is expressed through AGMs, through the courts, and by 
ﬁ ling a complaint with AMF (Autorité des Marchés Financiers). 
Consequently, in contrast to Wahal (1996), we consider that 
the highest degree of confrontational activism in France is 
exclusively constituted by takeover or exit. 
However the emergence of activist hedge funds and 
proxy professionals in France has changed the activism 
process. Ryan and Schneider (2002) demonstrated that 
institutional investor activism is expressed in a variety 
of degrees from confrontational to relational depending 
on investment and engagement practices determined 
by several factors such as legal constraints, fund size, 
investment time horizon, and sensitivity to pressures 
from business relationships and internal/external man-
agement. For example, the decision to manage a fund’s 
portfolio internally or externally has implications for the 
fund’s degree of activism. Ryan and Schneider assumed 
that external portfolio managers are likely to hold many 
of the same stocks across the portfolios they manage 
which give them a greater incentive to exert a higher 
degree of activism than the internal manager of a single 
fund. However, since the Ryan-Schneider model was 
published in 2002, the shareholder activism process has 
evolved.  In a recent study, Rubach and Sebora (2009) 
tested the Ryan-Schneider model. Their results showed 
that, contrary to the proposition of Ryan and Schneider 
(2002), institutions whose assets are mainly managed 
externally did not play an activist role. 
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In contrast with the period of the mid-1980s, which was 
characterized by the so-called “CalPERS effect” referring 
to the way in which the fund managed its activism stra-
tegies (Smith, 1996; Anson, White and Ho, 2004), today 
this category of fund is less directly engaged due to current 
regulatory and political constraints. These constraints 
include diversiﬁ cation and liquidity requirements to cover 
redemptions for beneﬁ ciaries. Moreover, it has become 
necessary for these pension funds to avoid conﬂ icts of 
interests arising from business relationships as well as 
social and political pressures. However, hedge funds are 
able to minimize these political risks by operating outside 
the framework of security regulation and registration 
requirements. Consequently, with the emergence of these 
new professional hedge fund shareholder activists, public 
pension funds such as CalPERS have outsourced the mana-
gement of the most confrontational degrees of activism 
through their relational investing (long-term arrangements 
through banks and corporate network allies) (Bhagat and 
al., 2004; Martin, Casson and Nisar, 2007). Pound (1992) 
reported that these allies are professionals operating 
through small entities such as investment partnerships or 
pools of funds which minimize activism costs and political 
risks. Moreover, Martellini, Le Sourd and Ziemann (2008) 
explained that due to the perfect storm of adverse market 
conditions during the past decade, institutional investors 
are desperately seeking new investment styles and asset 
classes that activist hedge funds provide because of their 
focus on higher absolute return. 
Meanwhile, other private equity funds or traditional 
investors prefer to internalize activism costs. For exam-
ple, through its proxy provider services, pooled fund as 
well as its index tracker fund, Hermes has internalized 
the costs and also the beneﬁ ts of its engagement actions. 
As analysed by Becht et al. (2009, p. 3), the Hermes UK 
Focus Fund (HUKFF) tactics consist of “increasing the 
stakes in companies that Hermes has already invested 
in through its index tracker fund, thereby the HUKFF 
partially internalizes the beneﬁ ts of activism to all sha-
reholders”. In addition, as a blend of traditional investor 
and hedge fund, HUKFF uses the equity loan market 
with the aim of decreasing the costs of activism implied 
in aggregating votes (Christoffersen, Geczy, Musto and 
Reed, 2007). In France, some private equity funds such 
as Wendel Investment and Eurazeo internalize this func-
tion. Other investors create pools of funds, such as the 
CEO of LVMH Bernard Arnault and Colony Capital which 
established Blue Capital. 
Degree of aggressiveness
Step 1: Target selection motives
• Low degree of aggressiveness
– Alter business strategy: carry out merger and acquisition
– Improve social and environmental issues
– Improve governance issues: rescind takeover defenses
– Other policies
• High degree of aggressiveness
– Cash payout to shareholders
– Alter business strategy: 
    – obtain focus (spin-offs, dismantle)
    – oppose to the merger
-Improve governance issues
    – oust CEO 
    – board members’ nomination
    – executive remuneration
International shareholder activist netw
orks
Professional activists
Activist engagement services 
Proxy advisors
Activist hedge funds
 
Degree of confrontational activism
Step 2: Private engagement 
Dialogue with targeted corporation and activist shareholders 
Write a letter to target corporation 
Threats to law suit
Civil and penal law
suits by French 
investor associations
Step 3: Public engagement
Media coverage
Dialogue to withdraw proposal(s)
Put forward proposals
Proxy battle at AGM
Step 4: Exit strategies
Takeover attempt
Exit of activists
                              
  
French hybrid model 
                              
  
Outsourced activism management
Disciplinary mechanisms Relational mechanisms
Table 1. Degrees of shareholder activism in France 
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II.  ■ INTERNATIONAL INVESTOR 
NETWORKS AND FRENCH 
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
In this section, we illustrate our conceptual model with 
a description of three shareholder activist professional 
actors that mobilize institutional investor networks.  We 
also apply it to evaluate the shareholder activist process 
when targeting French companies in particular. 
II.1. DESCRIPTION OF THREE 
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVIST 
PROFESSIONALS 
We document the origins and function of three sharehol-
der activist professional actors that mobilize international 
investor networks: a proxy analysis, voting recommendation 
and execution network (Risk Metrics/Deminor); a voting 
and private engagement network (Hermes EOS); and an 
institutional investor/activist hedge fund network (CalPERS 
and Knight Vinke). Using the conceptual model from Table 
1, we summarize the three activists’ degree of aggressive-
ness and confrontation; their engagement forms; and their 
shareholder activist network in Table 2. Once more using 
our conceptual model, we then evaluate recent shareholder 
activist groups and their institutional investor networks’ 
efforts in targeting French companies in particular. 
Risk Metrics/Deminor
Origin. Over the past few years, Risk Metrics acquired Ins-
titutional Shareholder Services (US) and Deminor (Europe), 
both specialists in proxy analysis and voting recommendation 
and execution.  Risk Metrics is the world’s largest provider 
of voting guidance, serving more than 1,700 investment 
institutions globally.  As legal and corporate governance 
requirements for shareholder voting have spread, proxy 
advisors like Risk Metrics have grown in inﬂ uence.
Function.  Risk Metrics/Deminor operates in two ways: 
ﬁ rst, it helps clients create their own customized voting 
policies, which it subsequently executes on their behalf; 
second, it analyzes companies’ proxies and provides voting 
recommendations to clients who may follow them or use 
them when making their own voting decisions. However, 
since many institutional investors do not have the internal 
capability to collect, translate and analyze company proxy 
voting material in time to vote, Risk Metrics’ recommen-
dations are very inﬂ uential. 
Hermes Equity Ownership Services (EOS)
Origin. Hermes EOS had over £40 billion of assets (as of 
30 September 2009) under stewardship for its network of 
institutional investor clients.  It fulﬁ ls the ﬁ duciary duty of 
its network of investors by voting their shares and engaging 
with companies to improve performance even when it is 
not responsible for investing its clients’ funds. Following 
the publication of the Myners report in March 2001 and 
the Institutional Shareholders Committee’s statement on 
shareholder responsibilities, all UK institutional investors 
are expected to take an active role in voting, monitoring 
company performance and where appropriate, engaging 
with companies to improve performance. In July 2004, 
Hermes responded to this expectation by creating EOS.  
Function. Hermes EOS analyzes annual reports and 
accounts to provide voting recommendations; assists 
clients with voting; and represents their interests in 
engagements with these companies. EOS seeks to keep 
its discussions private while they are proving constructive, 
or until the engagement is complete.  EOS leverages its 
engagement impact with companies through its extensive 
network of formal and informal contacts with other fund 
managers whether or not they are clients of EOS. Over the 
years, Hermes has established and participates actively 
in a number of national and international organizations 
dedicated to improvements in environmental, social and 
corporate governance issues.  EOS ﬁ nds potential allies 
for its company engagements through networks. 
CalPERS and Knight Vinke (KV)
Origin. The California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (CalPERS) increased the allocation of its $156.5 
billion global equity portfolio to its corporate governance 
fund from 3 percent to 5 percent plus or minus three per-
centage points (Pension and Investments, July 9, 2007). 
At the time of board approval of this re-allocation on 
June 18, 2007, this represented a maximum target level 
of $12.5 billion.  
Table 2. Degrees of shareholder activism for three shareholder activist groups
Aggressiveness degree Engagement forms Confrontational degree Shareholder activist network
Risk Metrics/ 
Deminor
Low to high Private and public Middle Proxy voting analysts who advise large 
institutional investor network
Hermes Equity 
Ownership Services 
(EOS)
Low to high Private
 Leverages impact 
through other fund 
managers.
Low EOS mobilizes institutional investor 
network through formal and informal 
contacts.
Knight Vinke High Private, public, exit and 
judicial
High CalPERS outsources activism by investing 
in activist hedge funds and mobilizing its 
network behind them. 
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Function. CalPERS invests in 10 hedge funds specia-
lized in corporate governance activism, including KV 
in Europe. While KV takes the lead in initiating and 
coordinating an institutional investor network behind 
its public shareholder activism to change management’s 
strategy, CalPERS publicly supports KV and votes its 
shares with KV.
In Table 3, we apply the process of outsourcing shareholder 
activism to the context of France.  We evaluate its degree 
of success, its degree of aggressivity and confrontation, 
and list the professional activist actors of the coalition 
that targeted each French company. Hedge fund activ-
ism in France is a recent phenomenon which intensiﬁ ed 
starting in 2006. In accordance with American studies 
(Brav et al, 2008), in France the activists’ success rate is 
high, but not always total. Since their “public engage-
ment” occurs prior to opening a dialogue (Huynh, 2009), 
hedge fund activists drop some of their demands during 
subsequent private discussions with management. This 
explains their partial success. Nevertheless, contrary to 
their practice in America, hedge funds collaborate in 
France with minority shareholder associations in order 
either to intensify their aggressivity or to gain recourse 
to litigation. Finally, it should be noted that Hermes EOS 
seeks to keep its engagement with company management 
and boards private while they are proving constructive. 
After several discussions among its fund managers and 
communications staff in response to the authors’ requests, 
Hermes EOS decided not to make public any information 
about its engagements with French companies other than 
to conﬁ rm that they engaged with Alcatel-Lucent, Galer-
ies Lafayette and Vinci, and that they publicly engaged in 
speciﬁ c networks to increase Environmental, Social and 
Governance standards in French listed corporations3. 
Hermes EOS utilizes its network £40 billion of assets to 
pursue engagements privately, although its efforts may 
be supplemented by more public activism.
III. Two illustrations of  ■
international shareholder 
activist networks’ role in 
French shareholder activism 
process
In Table 4, we apply our framework once again to 
analyze the international shareholder activist networks’ 
role in two cases: Suez/Gaz de France and Atos Origin. 
Detailed description of how the activism process played 
out in each case follows.
SUEZ:  Activist hedge fund’s impact on 
international investor network
Knight Vinke (KV) is an activist hedge fund that typically 
targets large European companies, buying about 1 percent 
and then persuading other investors to join its campaign 
to change the target’s strategy. Its ﬂ agship fund, with a 
signiﬁ cant investment from CalPERS, California’s state 
pension fund, among others, has more than $1.5 billion 
under management.
On July 22, 2004, the French government partially pri-
vatized Gaz de France (GDF), while guaranteeing that it 
would not lower its stakeholding below 70 percent. On 
February 25, 2006, Dominique de Villepin, then Prime 
Minister of France, announced the merger of GDF and 
Suez, which effectively would lower the government’s 
stakeholding to 34% in the merged entity. GDF’s unions 
and the opposition political parties (Communist and 
Socialists) were ﬁ rmly opposed. Meanwhile, the Euro-
pean regulatory authorities opened a lengthy anti-trust 
investigation concerning the impact on competition in 
France and Belgium, and imposed several divestments 
of Suez’s assets.  
On September 3, 2006, Gaz de France and Suez announced 
agreed terms of merger, on the basis of an exchange of 21 
Gaz de France shares for 22 Suez shares via the absorp-
tion of Suez by Gaz de France. On September 7, 2006, 
an extremely contentious debate concerning the merger 
opened in l’Assemblée Nationale; on October 25, 2006, 
the Sénat adopted the merger; and on November 8, 2006, 
the ﬁ nal text was adopted by both legislative bodies. On 
November 30, 2006, the Conseil Constitutionnel accepted 
the merger, but stipulated that it could not take effect 
until July 1, 2007.
During September and October 2006, Knight Vinke, the 
shareholder activist, published 13 full-page newspaper 
advertisements advocating that the two companies should 
agree to a spin-off and public listing of Suez Environne-
ment to help the companies merge. 
On November 16, 2006, the French investor association 
ADAM publicly criticized the banks involved in the merger, 
notably HSBC, for their lack of independence in determin-
ing the share exchange ratio between GDF and Suez. 
Suez owned Electrabel, the Belgian electricity company, 
whose signiﬁ cant shareholder, Albert Frère, demanded on 
November 21, 2006 a special dividend of 4 euros per share 
to compensate for the share exchange ratio. The same 
day, Knight Vinke, the shareholder activist, demanded a 
special dividend of 6.5 to 7 euros per share. There was 
speculation in the press that Knight was a stalking horse 
for savvy Belgian investor Albert Frère, who controlled 7.2% 
of Suez stock through Groupe Bruxelles Lambert (GBL) 
and was vice-chairman of Suez.  Knight once worked for 
Frère’s Pargesa Group. On December 22, 2006, KV pub-
lished an open letter in the French newspaper, Le Figaro, 
stating that the valuation of Suez’s shares under the merger 
proposal was very insufﬁ cient, and recommended Suez’s 
board should suspend the merger. KV reported that 18 out 
of 20 major institutional investors, including CalPERS, 
had strong reservations about the merger. 
On December 29, 2006, market rumors surfaced that 
François Pinault might launch a takeover of Suez, which 
were repeated throughout January 2007, and its share 
price rose. On January 4, 2007, President Jacques Chirac 
announced that the GDF Suez merger was a “strategic 
project for France and for Europe.”  On January 12, Albert 
Frère increased his shareholding in Suez to 9.5 percent 
of capital. Over 10 days ending on January 15, 2007 in the 
midst of this market speculation about Suez’s eventual 
ownership, KV sold its nearly 1 percent of Suez shares. 
GirardFocus.indd   Sec1:7 5/01/12   17:12:41
Bankers, Markets & Investors nº 116 january-february 2012 73
At the same time, another group of professional activists 
entered Suez’s capital.  In the end, Suez’s environment 
division was listed separately on the French stock exchange 
and the valuation for the remaining Suez improved in the 
merger. GDF Suez ﬁ nally merged on July 22, 2008.  
ATOS ORIGIN: Proxy advisors’ impact on 
international investor network
The activism process in Atos Origin, a French SSII, 
began with private negotiations between the Centaurus 
hedge fund and the management of Atos Origin. On 
October 23, 2006, Centaurus was the referent shareholder 
with 5.49% of shares. After the failure of negotiations, 
Centaurus and Pardus, another hedge fund, announced 
publicly a joint action “to put pressure on the board…to 
explore all strategic alternatives” such as “a dismantling” 
(Les Echos, October 10, 2007). Two days before the public 
announcement, Pardus bought 7.32% of the shares and 
the voting rights of Atos Origin. 
At this confrontational step of the activism process, they 
publicly pressured the board to dismantle the company, 
and later demanded seats on the board and the dismissal 
of the CEO of Atos Origin, Philippe Germon. They also 
mandated the services of local activist professionals, namely 
ADAM the French investor association (Les Echos, April 1, 
2008), to support their proposals. However, Atos Origin 
management convinced Investor Sight and Deminor, two 
proxy voting advisors to a large network of international 
investors, to support their position. Deminor maintained 
that Colette Neuville, the CEO of the French investor 
association ADAM, was not independent because of her 
business relations with the two hedge funds. 
On the basis of paper votes, Centaurus and Colette Neu-
ville should have been elected to the board at the AGM, 
and the chairman Didier Cherpitel should have been 
dismissed (Les Echos, May 23, 2008). However, the CEO 
of Atos Origin, Philippe Germon, reacted by adjourn-
ing the meeting when unexpectedly the chairman of the 
ESOP (Employee Stock Option Plan) fund board stated 
publicly that he would use the 3% of ESOP voting rights 
to vote in favor of the activist coalition.
Finally, the two coalitions announced the end of the 
confrontational activities in Les Echos on May 27, 2008. The 
activist coalition gained the nomination of their members to 
the board, but proceeded to take the most confrontational 
step by selling its shareholding to PAI partners. 
In November 2008, Thierry Breton (the former French 
Minister of the Economy) replaced Philippe Germon, 
the CEO. 
As studied by Bessiere, Kaestner and Lafont (2010, 
p.17), Atos Origin is an interesting clinical case in 
the sense that French state intervention can “create a 
strong support to managers’ entrenchment despite the 
relevance strategic changes required by activists” and 
may explain the partial success of the activist coalition. 
In this case, ﬁ ve days before the AGM, Senator Marini 
publicly expressed his concern by stating that Atos 
Origin risked being dismantled if the two funds were 
to succeed in taking control of it.  
Conclusion  ■
International institutional investor networks will 
exercise increasing inﬂ uence in French companies via 
international and local country professional activists. As 
these investor networks own an increasing percentage 
of French shares, both the legal changes in France and 
the outsourcing of their ﬁ duciary voting duty to profes-
sional activists facilitate their greater voice in French 
corporate governance.
However, the two studies suggest that shareholder 
activism is a learning process that is becoming increas-
ingly professional. Moreover, all local players, including 
management, employee shareholders, state government, 
local professional activists (such as investor associations) 
as well as activist sponsors themselves, are learning 
more sophisticated tactics. Surprisingly, the number of 
French corporations targeted by activist hedge funds is 
weak compared with the US context. As underlined by 
the two explanatory cases, the French state government 
exerts both lobbying activities and inﬂ uential activities 
to increase activism costs for the hedge fund sponsors 
in order to reduce the probability that they achieve their 
initial stated objectives.
Our descriptive and exploratory study highlights an 
attractive ﬁ eld for additional research concerning col-
laborative investor networks and shareholder activists. 
In particular, how are these networks evolving? How 
are they collaborating with other institutional investor 
networks? And to what extent do they have an impact on 
targeted corporations? ■
Table 4. Degrees of shareholder activism in Suez/Gaz de France 
and Atos Origin cases
Aggressiveness
degree
Engagement forms Confrontational 
degree
Shareholder activist network
Suez/Gaz de France High Public and judicial High YES.  18 of 20 major institutional investors 
mobilized by Knight Vinke; Centaurus; 
Pardus
Atos Origin High Private, public, exit and 
judicial
High YES.  Two proxy voting services advised 
institutional investor network to block 
activist hedge funds.
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